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Abstract Behavioral economics (BE) examines the implications for decision-mak-
ing when actors suffer from biases documented in the psychological literature. This
article considers how such biases affect regulatory decisions. The article posits a sim-
ple model of a regulator who serves as an agent to a political overseer. The regulator
chooses a policy that accounts for the rewards she receives from the political over-
seer—whose optimal policy is assumed to maximize short-run outputs that garner
political support, rather than long-term welfare outcomes—and the weight the regula-
tor puts on the optimal long run policy. Flawed heuristics and myopia are likely to lead
regulators to adopt policies closer to the preferences of political overseers than they
would otherwise. The incentive structure for regulators is likely to reward those who
adopt politically expedient policies, either intentionally (due to a desire to please the
political overseer) or accidentally (due to bounded rationality). The article urges that
careful thought be given to calls for greater state intervention, especially when those
calls seek to correct firm biases. The article proposes measures that focus rewards
to regulators on outcomes rather than outputs as a way to help ameliorate regulatory
biases.
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1 Introduction
Behavioral economics (BE) examines the implications for decision-making when
actors suffer from biases documented in the psychological literature. BE scholars
replace the assumption of rationality with one of “bounded rationality,” in which con-
sumers’ actions are affected by their initial endowments, their tastes for fairness, their
inability to appreciate future costs, their lack of self-control, and the general use of
flawed heuristics. BE is increasingly visible in a modern antitrust scholarship that
is skeptical of entry as a means to correct anticompetitive markets;doubts the inher-
ent instability of cartels; disputes the efficiency of bundling; and challenges claims
that restrictions on intra-brand price competition promote inter-brand competition in
non-price dimensions (e.g., Stucke 2007; Tor 2002; Tor and Rinner 2011).
There are serious questions about BE’s import for public policy (Klick and Mitchell
2006; Ginsburg and Moore 2010; Wright 2007; Wright and Stone 2011),but that is
not our focus. Rather, in the spirit of the public choice—which was revolutionary by
peeling back the curtain of government policy to examine how self-interested deci-
sion makers would act—we withdraw the veil of policy-making to study how bounded
rationality affects regulatory decisions. Several BE scholars recognize this possibility
(e.g., Jolls et al. 1998; Bennett et al. 2010), but generally treat it as a second-order
problem compared to the likely biases that beset consumers.1 We aim to fill this gap
in the literature.
We posit a simple model of a regulator who serves as an agent to a political over-
seer. The regulator chooses a policy that accounts for the rewards she receives from the
political overseer—whose optimal policy is assumed to maximize short-run outputs
that garner political support, rather than long-term welfare outcomes—and the weight
the regulator puts on the optimal long run policy. We use this model to explore the
effects of bounded rationality on policymaking, with particular emphasis on compe-
tition and consumer protection policy. We find (unsurprisingly) that flawed heuristics
(e.g., availability, representativeness, optimism, and hindsight) and myopia are likely
to lead regulators to adopt policies closer to the preferences of political overseers than
they would otherwise. The effect of status quo and confirmation biases is less clear,
and depends on initial policy positions, the order and veracity of information flows,
and the regulator’s priors (or first piece of evidence). We conjecture that confirmation
bias may create a weak tendency to adopt politically expedient policies given that the
first piece of evidence a regulator views on a matter likely will be a call to action.
1 One notable exception is Rachlinski and Farina (2002), who compare the positive and normative impli-
cations of both BE and public choice theory for institutional design. They focus on the interaction among
Congress, the executive, courts, and regulators. We provide a formal treatment, allowing public choice
theory and BE simultaneously to shape policy outcomes.
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Unlike the case of firms that face competition, we argue that the incentive structure
for regulators is likely to reward those who adopt politically expedient policies, either
intentionally (due to a desire to please the political overseer) or accidentally (due to
bounded rationality). These incentives are likely to yield a cadre of regulators who
focus excessively on outputs rather than outcomes. Our analysis suggests that careful
thought be given to calls for greater state intervention, especially when those calls
are directed at firm biases. We also conjecture that instituting internal and/or external
teams to review policy, and focusing rewards on outcomes rather than outputs, can
help ameliorate regulatory biases.
Section 2 provides a simple model of regulation and explores the implications of
bounded rationality in policy making. Section 3 considers how much regulators are
likely to suffer biases. Section 4 suggests ways to design the decision-making structure
to ameliorate these biases. Section 5 concludes.
2 A simple model of regulation
In this section we present a simple model, where a regulator chooses a policy, π R ,
to maximize her utility. In our model, the regulator ultimately must approve a market
intervention.2 Utility is a function both of the distance (in policy space) the chosen
policy is from the policy that the regulator believes is best for society, π∗, and politi-
cal rewards—future promotions, increased budgets, fewer hearings, good press—from
political overseers for choosing policies that maximize their chances of reelection, πos .
We assume that πos is a politically expedient policy that maximizes short-run outputs
(or resource use). This follows from the observation that constituents (i.e., people) are
likely to suffer from various biases that cause them to demand short-sighted policies.
Politicians exploit these biases to provide short-run solutions to non-problems that are
likely to facilitate reelection.3 In this manner, the political overseers in our model act
as transparent middlemen, who convert boundedly rational constituents’ preferences
into policy demands. Jolls et al. (1998), for example, explain Superfund as an appeal
to biased voters by “availability entrepreneurs.” A more recent example consistent
with politicians taking advantage of the “availability bias” includes the recent German
decision to abandon nuclear power in the wake of the Japanese nuclear crisis. There-
fore, πos could include an investigation of market manipulation, an anti-price gouging
law, or even price controls imposed to cap surging gasoline prices. Each policy allows
the politician to appear to take steps to counteract high gasoline prices. Such moves
increase the probability of reelection relative to the politician who took no action and
tried to explain that retail gasoline prices were a function of supply and demand on
world markets for crude oil and warned that attempts artificially to lower prices by
regulation are likely to cause harm.
2 Rachlinski and Farina (2002) distinguish between career bureaucrats and agency heads in terms of exper-
tise. We focus on agency leaders who must approve interventions.
3 Of course, this assumes that politicians lack biases when estimating policies that will reelect them.
DellaVigna (2009, p. 364), for example, argues that politicians are likely to be rational and constituents
biased.
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Formally, we write:
U = U [θπ∗; (1 − θ)φ(πos)] (1)
In (1), π∗ measures the distance the adopted policy, π R , is from π∗. The regulator
receives disutility as this distance increases, and places weight θ ≤ 1 on π∗. The
term πos is the distance between πos and the regulator’s chosen policy, π R . The
function φ(·) translates increases in πos into punishments for the regulator, such as
lower budgets and more hearings. The regulator places a weight (1 − θ) on disutility
due to political punishments. For tractability in what follows, we arbitrarily assume
that the policy space from which the regulator chooses π R is bounded from below by
π∗, and from above by πos . The distance between these end points is exogenously
determined and assumed to be strictly positive. Thus, higher values of π R translate
into more populist policies. We adopt the following functional form of (1):
U = S − θ
2
(π R − π∗) − (1 − θ)
2
φ(π O S − π R), (2)
where S is the level of utility that could be realized if π R = π∗ = π O S . Solving the
first order condition of (2) for π R yields:
π R = λ(θπ∗ + (1 − θ)φπos), (3)
where λ = 1
θ+(1−θ)φ .
Equation 3 shows that the regulator’s optimal policy choice is a weighted average
of the one she believes best for society’s long-run interests and the one that garners
the most short-run political support. In this manner, departures from the long-run effi-
ciency benchmark π∗ may enter policy through two channels: indirectly via political
overseers’ preferences, and directly through a biased regulator’s preferences.
From (3) we see that a regulator will adopt the optimal policy choice if either she
places no weight on political rewards (θ = 1) or if the politician cannot translate
constituency support into support (or punishment) for the regulator (φ = 0). On the
other hand, the regulator who weighs political advancement heavily (θ ≈ 0) or is
subject to a powerful political overseer (φ large) is more likely to choose the politi-
cally expedient policy. In what follows, we use this simple framework to examine how
commonly cited biases might affect policy outcomes.
2.1 Flawed heuristics and myopia
If regulators suffer from the biases that plague consumers, they are likely to use heuris-
tics—or mental shortcuts—to estimate the optimal long-run policy choice, π∗. These
shortcuts save time but may yield systematic decision-making errors. Much experi-
mental research has documented the existence of several flawed heuristics, which are
likely to bias regulators against accounting for long-run considerations when forming
policy (Korobkin and Ulen 2000; Jolls 2007).
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First, the availability heuristic leads people to overemphasize recent, particularly
salient events when estimating the overall prevalence of those events. A person who
recently witnessed his neighbor’s house burn down, for example, is likely to overesti-
mate the odds that his own house will burn in the future. Second, the representative-
ness heuristic causes people to form unduly high estimates of posterior probabilities
by ignoring low baseline probabilities and small sample sizes. The canonical exam-
ple of this bias comes from the Kahneman and Tversky (1982) experiment in which
consumers are asked whether it was more likely that a hypothetical woman was a
bank teller or a feminist bank teller. The former category clearly contains the latter,
but most subjects placed a higher probability on the latter category. Third, people
suffering from the hindsight bias tend to overestimate the ex ante probability of an
event occurring, given that it has actually occurred. For example, a jury considering a
negligence case may be too likely to find the defendant’s actions were unreasonable ex
ante because they know an accident resulted. Finally, optimism bias causes individuals
to underestimate their own probability of experiencing a bad outcome.
Apart from flawed estimation strategies for unlikely events, regulators also may
suffer from myopia, which arises from cognitive inability to process life-cycle costs
or from self-control problems. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) model myopic consumers
who cannot understand a durable good’s full life-cycle cost. They find that even under
competitive conditions, firms may lack incentives to educate myopic individuals and
will offer low up-front prices and supra-competitive aftermarket prices in equilibrium.
Rachlinski and Farina (2002) posit that myopia works not only in a temporal dimension
but also across subject matters; when designing policies, experts may focus narrowly
on their specific areas of responsibility and ignore spillover effects.
In a similar vein, some have examined the inability of actors to bind themselves to
take future action that maximizes long-run utility, as viewed from the initial period.
Laibson (1997) develops a theory of time-inconsistent or hyperbolic discounting to
explain why consumers consistently contribute less to their retirement accounts than
a rational actor model would predict. Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004) present a
formal model in which agents plagued by hyperbolic discounting make multi-period
decisions and derive an equilibrium in which firms may be able to take advantage of
consumers who underestimate their future will power. They find support for their model
in observed contracts and consumer behavior in the credit and health club markets.
Myopic regulators who use flawed heuristics are likely to make imprecise estimates
of the optimal policy choice, π∗, which they use to form policy, π R . In what follows
we assume that these biases are likely to lead the regulator to favor policies that focus
excessively on short-run considerations. Although we recognize that this assumption
risks converting our model into a tautology, we argue that this assumption is grounded
in reality and more plausible than the alternative that biases lead regulators to focus
more sharply on optimal long-run policies.
Jolls et al. (1998, p. 1518), for example, argue that the availability bias gives rise
to the “pollutant of the month syndrome,” in which highly publicized events lead reg-
ulators to pursue overly stringent environmental regulation. Representativeness bias
may cause a competition authority to ignore the prevalence of a business practice (e.g.,
exclusive dealing) in competitive industries and overlook the low prior odds that mar-
kets are noncompetitive, when it attempts to judge the probability that the practice will
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reduce a market’s competitiveness. Similarly, in the quasi-negligence determinations
involved in certain consumer protection violations, hindsight bias is likely to cause an
agency to look more skeptically on practices that led to harm ex post. Optimism bias
may cause regulators to hold an unduly optimistic view of the likely success of a policy
choice. More generally, to the extent that regulators are better characterized as “lay”
rather than “expert” decisions-makers, Rachlinski and Farina’s (2002, p. 572) warning
that representativeness, availability bias, and loss aversion likely will cause Congress
to focus on the wrong set of problems and solutions also applies to regulators.4
Returning to our formal model, we can write the regulator’s estimate of π∗, πˆ∗ =
απ∗, with α ≥ 1. In this case, she underestimates the gap between π∗ and πos , with πˆ∗
as the perceived lower bound in policy space. Consequently, the regulator will choose
policy π˜ R = 1
λ
(θπˆ∗ + (1 − θ)φπos), which is closer to πos than π R , the unbiased
policy choice.
Because the effects of bounded rationality and a taste for political rewards work in
the same direction, it is not possible in our model to identify these effects separately.5
Even an unbiased regulator has an incentive to choose populist policies due to the
political rewards that come from instant action, especially with limited time horizons.
2.2 Status quo bias
Various cognitive errors together tend irrationally to wed people to the status quo.
First, due to what is known as the endowment effect, experimental subjects seem to
require more compensation to part with an endowment than they are willing to pay to
gain it (Korobkin and Ulen 2000, pp. 107–108). The observed willingness-to-accept
(WTA)/willingness-to-pay (WTP) gap suggests that people are more averse to losing
what they already possess than rational choice theory predicts.6 Second, loss aversion
suggests that framing of decisions matters, because people place a higher negative
value on expected losses than on expected gains of equivalent value. Relatedly, the
omission/commission bias leads subjects to be concerned more with errors associated
with action than inaction. These cognitive shortcomings create inertia to maintain a
current course of action rather than take new action that would increase expected util-
ity. Concern about this bias has inspired vigorous debate on proper default rules for
consumer choices over retirement plans, insurance coverage, and privacy policies, and
has raised questions about the efficiency of Coasian solutions to property rights issues
(e.g., Korobkin and Ulen 2000, pp. 1109–1111; Camerer et al. 2003, pp. 1226–1230).
Following this argument, the class of cognitive shortcomings that make regula-
tors reluctant to alter the status quo will tend to make policies “sticky” around initial
policies. The direction in which the status quo bias will steer policy is indetermi-
nate theoretically, and will depend on the initial policy endowment and the direction
4 Rachlinski and Farina (2002, p. 562) also contend that specialization from committees and learning from
incumbency may ameliorate the effects of these biases.
5 This result flows directly from our assumption that biases tend to focus regulators on short-term, rather
than long-term, solutions.
6 More technically, the endowment effect means that the marginal rate of substitution between two goods





Fig. 1 Regulatory policy with flawed heuristics/myopia
of the changes in π∗ and πos . For example, suppose that new learning suggests a
more aggressive policy is needed to maximize consumer welfare, shown in Fig. 1 as
a movement in the lower bound of policy space from π∗0 to π∗1 .
A rational regulator would adopt policy π R1 in response to this change, but a reg-
ulator affected by loss aversion would move only to π˜ R1 because she perceives the
movement away from π∗0 as more expensive than she would have perceived prior to
his endowment at policy π R0 . Similar changes in π O S would generate similarly muted
responses. From this stickiness emerges a path dependency in policy choice, where
policies adopted in the past have a lingering impact on future policy adoption.
2.3 Confirmation bias
A large body of experimental research suggests that individuals tend to become irra-
tionally wedded to their early impressions about an initially ambiguous situation.7
This confirmation bias comes about either because subjects ignore all new evidence
once they have made up their minds, or because they erroneously interpret evidence
contradicting their beliefs as supporting their beliefs. In regulatory settings, confirma-
tion bias leads to overconfidence in one’s estimates of optimal policy. At the micro
level, regulators may misread or ignore evidence that conflicts with the theory of a
case or policy initiative. Consider the example of an antitrust agency team preparing
to challenge a merger as likely to harm competition. The team may tend to interpret
documents from the merging parties that, seen objectively, tend to cast the merger in
a competitive light as either neutral or supportive of their case. As Jolls (2007, p. 15)
notes, several experimental studies find that litigants tend to interpret ambiguous evi-
dence as supporting their view of the case. This leads to the counterintuitive finding
that greater information revelation can actually reduce the possibility of settlement. At
the macro level, the regulator may misread evidence to confirm priors regarding larger
policy choices, such as adopting an interventionist or laissez-faire attitude toward
certain business practices.
7 Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) and Lowenstein and Moore (2004) document this bias in experimental
settings involving litigants.
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In the simple binary context, confirmation bias will have an asymmetric effect on
policy outcomes; regulators with incorrect priors cause more harm than their counter-
parts who are irrationally wedded to the correct decision. For example, assume that the
correct prior odds on vertical restraints is a laissez-faire posture: P(A)P(C) < 1, where P(A)
and P(C) are the probabilities that an observed vertical restraint is anticompetitive
and procompetitive, respectively. A regulator with strong priors that vertical restraints
are anticompetitive (i.e., P(A)P(C) < 1) is likely to misinterpret evidence to confirm this
belief, leading to welfare-reducing interventions. On the other hand, a regulator with
correct priors may be too pessimistic about the odds that a given vertical practice is
anticompetitive, but nonetheless makes the correct policy choice. Given a distribution
of policy decisions, at the margin, a regulator with such a bias will bring too few
vertical cases, but because her bias is toward the correct decision, overconfidence will
have a smaller effect on the efficacy of ultimate policy choices.
If the regulator begins with a truly blank slate, the first information she receives
about a matter will shape her bias when she interprets future evidence. In theory, there
is no way to identify the direction of the bias. In practice, however, the first information
a regulator is likely see is some form of evidence supporting action (e.g., initiating an
investigation or issuing a proposed rule); agency decision-makers are likely to learn
of many policy issues only when staff or a political overseer requests intervention. An
antitrust decision-maker often learns for the first time of a possible anticompetitive
merger or business practice upon reading a staff memorandum that seeks compulsory
process to investigate the matter. By their nature, these memoranda present a case
for investigation. The investigation’s targets are unlikely to present their views to the
decision-maker until much later in the process. Similarly, the first piece of evidence
can come from political overseers calling for an investigation into a practice. Here,
again, the targets have no opportunity to counter the charges until the process is well
advanced. If these requests for action become the anchoring point from which the
regulator interprets subsequent evidence to estimate π R , it will lead to an intervention
bias even where the regulator weighs long-run welfare heavily (i.e., high θ ).
In practice, we doubt that regulators begin with a truly blank slate. More realisti-
cally, regulators approach decisions with priors, or a “mental model” of how the world
works. This model likely correlates with political beliefs, education, and experience
(Wind and Crook 2009). Like the Bayesian “blank-slate” updating framework, the reg-
ulator screens out or discounts information that does not conform to her pre-existing
world view in a desire to achieve policy outcomes consistent with her model. The key
difference is that the regulator does not begin as an empty vessel when faced with each
policy choice. Rather, she evaluates even the first piece of information with potential
bias. Thus, an antitrust regulator who views markets as generally self-correcting is
less likely to find evidence sufficient to support intervention than a counterpart who
views business practices skeptically. Unlike the “blank slate” model, even if the first
piece of information is a call for action from staff or a political overseer, the skeptical
regulator will not process future information to confirm the call for action, but rather
through her existing framework. Consequently, an intervention skeptic will require
more “pro-intervention” information to reach a decision to intervene than a regulator
operating with a truly blank slate.
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Publicly stated positions also can anchor policy. Once a regulator takes a position
on a particular policy, she will want to filter future matters in a way that verifies her
initial wisdom. These public pronouncements will represent the regulator’s true belief
of π R blended with the influence of political patrons—for example, promises made
during confirmation hearings to assure support—to arrive at a π R0 . In this way, the
policy underlying the time 0 public announcement is not itself biased. Future policy
decisions, however, are biased to the extent that future estimates of optimal long-run
policy, πˆ∗, stem from confirmation bias anchored on the policy announced in time 0.8
As with loss aversion, this anchoring can lead to path dependency in regulatory policy
adoption.
Confirmation bias also can reinforce preferences for short-sighted decisions that
derive from the flawed heuristics and myopia introduced in Sect. 2.1. As discussed
above, a myopic regulator is more likely than a rational regulator to invest suboptimally
in policy development. This decision will form the regulator’s priors, and non-con-
forming subsequent evidence will have a minimal effect on changing the regulator’s
world view. In this manner, myopia and confirmation bias can reinforce each another.
When confirmation bias affects a boundedly rational regulator, a decision to initiate
litigation or rulemaking due to insufficient consideration of long term costs and ben-
efits will shape the interpretation of subsequent information in a way that tends to
depict the decision favorably.
3 Will regulators suffer from biases in the long run?
A threshold question we have not addressed is how much regulators are actually likely
to suffer from biases? On one hand, if regulatory institutions operate like firms there
are reasons to believe that regulators in large part may escape the cognitive problems
that plague consumer decision-making. The consensus within BE scholarship appears
to be that firms are unlikely to make systematically biased decisions in the long run.
DellaVigna (2009, p. 361) explains how consumers and firms differ:
Experience is the key difference. Unlike individual consumers, firms can spe-
cialize, hire consultants, and obtain feedback from large data sets and capital
markets . . . Compared to consumers, therefore, firms are less likely to be affected
by biases (except for principal-agent problems), and we expect them to be close
to profit maximization.
Recent evidence also suggests that consumers who initially display biases can learn to
overcome them with marketplace experience.9 Is it reasonable to assume that because
regulators often are “experts” and face similar problems repeatedly they will be able
to make unbiased policy decisions? Even if agency heads who make decisions are
political appointees and not true field experts, as Rachlinski and Farina (2002, p. 579)
note, agency career staff can provide expertise and experience.
8 That is πˆ∗1 = f (π R0 (π∗0 )).
9 List (2003, 2004) finds evidence that the endowment effect fades as agents become more experienced
traders.
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The analogy between firms and regulatory institutions extends only so far. The
feedback mechanism that facilitates learning differs significantly between firms and
regulators. Unlike the marketplace, which quickly gives firms feedback in the form of
prices, profits, and output, the link between public policy decisions and outcomes is
more attenuated. Accurate measurement of a policy’s welfare effects can be difficult
and is somewhat rare. Even when effects are determined, the lag from a policy choice
to policy execution can be long; cases and rule making can take several years from
their initiation through final appeals in the courts. As the link between a decision and
feedback weakens, the ability to learn diminishes.
Another consideration is that the costs for the regulator for being wrong are low
compared to those of a firm. Generally speaking, a company that makes systematic
mistakes is more likely to exit than a regulatory body that continually adopts welfare-
reducing policies. The head of such an agency may continue to enjoy rewards as long
as she increases outputs on margins that political overseers care about—action that
maximizes the probability of reelection. When competition among regulatory bodies
occurs, it likely assumes the form of activities (e.g., protection of jurisdictional bound-
aries, the output of observable policy interventions) that have no necessary correlation
with positive welfare outcomes.
The weak connection between welfare and regulatory rewards can yield a cadre of
regulators who are biased toward short-run politically expedient policies. It is obvious
that the regulator with a low θ will tend to enjoy policy rewards. The regulator with a
high θ , but who suffers from myopia or confirmation bias, however, may accidently
receive more support than an unbiased regulator with a similar taste for long-run
welfare maximization. A biased regulator who sees herself as independent from polit-
ical control nonetheless may bring a large number of cases that grab headlines but
reduce welfare. Although viewed as welfare maximizing policy by the regulator, an
objective observer would see these as politically expedient policies, which please
the political overseer. Thus, regulators with short-term biases—due to high political
weighting and bias—are likely to be over represented in the population of regulators.
In sum, it appears that the regulatory feedback structure makes it unlikely that reg-
ulators will learn to overcome their biases. This distinction between regulatory and
market feedback is significant: marketplace performance directly measures consumer
benefit from actions, whereas regulatory outputs have no necessary relationship to con-
sumer welfare. Even if rewards were tied more closely with outcomes, the time lags
and measurement problems discussed above make it difficult to link clear regulatory
failures to specific regulators, especially given short tenures.
These observations warrant caution in assuming the efficacy of intervention to cor-
rect perceived firm biases. For example, Stucke (2007) and Tor (2002) argue that
because firms may overestimate their chances of successful entry into a market, anti-
trust authorities should place less confidence on entry as a means to ameliorate potential
anticompetitive effects. Tor and Rinner (2011) propose that the rule of reason be
applied more stringently to minimum resale price maintenance agreements to account
for the possibility that biases lead firms to overestimate the profit-reducing effects of
price competition. These normative prescriptions for enhanced intervention implicitly
assume that the decisions of regulators to intervene will not themselves stem from
biases. When these biases guide policy choices, it is not evident that regulators will
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be able to intervene successfully to “correct” firms’ entry and vertical contracting
decisions. Comparing the limitations of private and public decision making, market
feedback is likely to correct biases more effectively than regulatory feedback.
The role of markets in correcting firm biases also suggests an important role for
antitrust enforcement. Although regulatory biases may exacerbate already-existing
tendencies for antitrust authorities to intervene in markets too often, a competitive
market is a necessary condition for firms to correct their biases. If firms are to learn
from the market, mistakes need to be costly. A rational firm generally will earn higher
profits than a biased firm, conditional on the competitiveness of the market in which
it operates.10 However, the feedback from poor decisions—and hence the incentive to
correct biases—is stronger for a biased firm operating in a competitive market than one
facing little competition. Sound competition enforcement directly ameliorates welfare
losses from the illegal exercise of market power and indirectly may improve market
performance in the spirit of Hayek by enhancing the information flows that firms need
to identify and correct biases.
How much biases survive depends upon the costs of being wrong. When it is dif-
ficult to detect flawed decisions and the costs of being wrong are small, there is little
incentive to invest in correcting biases. We next discuss how improved accountabil-
ity—linking outcomes to rewards—can help ameliorate this problem.
4 Possible correcting mechanisms
As Sect. 2 shows, not all biases predict the same policy drift; some tend to temper
others. For example, availability, representativeness, optimism, and myopia probably
push regulators to adopt more politically expedient policies. Although we posit that
information coming to regulators is likely to be calls for intervention, the effect of
confirmation bias is uncertain, depending on the regulators’ priors, and the order and
relative veracity of information flows. Finally, the status quo bias can stabilize policies
around a focal point, but there is no a priori means to determine whether policy is stuck
closer to a long-run optimal policy or a politically expedient one.
Imagine a regulator who suffers from all the biases we have cataloged and inherits
an agency with a relatively interventionist policy stance. Assume also that her priors
are weighted toward long-run welfare maximizing policies. The biases of availability,
representativeness, myopia, and overconfidence could pull the regulator’s estimate of
the optimal policy closer to the political overseers’ preferred position. Given her pri-
ors, however, the regulator would tend overly to discount calls from staff and political
overseers calling for intervention, and to misinterpret evidence that supports interven-
tion as evidence in favor of non-intervention. At the same time, because the status quo
is assumed to be one of relative intervention, she may hesitate to disturb the agency’s
current posture.
The point is that we cannot predict how a boundedly rational regulator suffering
from a collection of biases will act. We can say that her actions will have no systematic
10 Armstrong and Huck (2010) describe instances where “irrational” firms may earn higher profits than
rational ones.
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correlation with optimal long-run policy; if they happen to mesh, it is due only to
chance. Accordingly, if there is value to predictable policy, the elimination of regula-
tory bias is desirable. This section explores the potential of two strategies for reducing
the harm associated with these biases: insulation and de-biasing.
4.1 Insulation
Through “insulation,”a “choice architect” eliminates (or makes more difficult to
choose) poor alternatives (e.g., smoking, fatty foods, payday borrowing) from the
choice set, thereby protecting the biased decision-maker from bad decisions. Much
BE literature advocates this type of paternalistic solution in the context of flawed
consumer decision-making. It is unclear how insulation would work to eliminate reg-
ulatory bias.
In practice, legislatures and courts limit regulatory discretion. For example, leg-
islation directing agency action (e.g., rule-making or law enforcement) defines the
scope—sometimes narrowly—of the agency’s authority to act. Some scholars have
written on the need of legislatures to implement ex ante statutory constraints to curb
ex post opportunism by regulators.11 Courts also police agencies to assure fealty to
congressional intent, the Administrative Procedure Act, and constitutional strictures.
In theory, legislatures and courts could use the same tools to eliminate poor choices
from the regulator’s set. To the extent that insulation strategies bind regulators to cer-
tain future actions to maximize welfare, they avoid suffering the issue of “consumer
sovereignty” that plagues choice architecture directed at myopic consumers.
To employ these ex ante and ex post restraints to insulate agencies from poor reg-
ulatory choices, one must establish objectively “correct” choices. Doing so requires
an unbiased choice architect. For the reasons detailed in Sect. 2, there is no reason
to believe that legislatures could systematically identify and limit poor choices from
the regulator’s set. Instead, they are likely to encourage them. As Rachlinski and
Farina (2002, p. 578) note, the seriatim nature of judicial decision making, focused
on particular parties and unique facts, is likely to diminish a court’s ability to escape
cognitive bias through learning, particularly when dealing with complex regulations.
Because courts stake out positions in their published decisions, they may be especially
susceptible to confirmation bias anchored on their previous rulings.
Even if one could find an unbiased architect, the informational demands to establish
the optimal future regulatory choice set may be insurmountable. Deciding to block or
restrict certain regulatory paths is a far more complex task than placing the fruit in
front of the fries in the cafeteria. Any insulation strategy involving ex post review by
11 For example, Knieps and Weib (2007) note:
Since it is well-known that regulatory authorities cannot be forced into welfare-maximising behavior,
the question arises whether opportunistic behavior can be excluded by the design and implementa-
tion of adequate hostages . . . Regulatory authorities as part of the bureaucracy cannot be fined for
inadequate behavior. As a consequence, it is only by means of a statutory constraint that opportunist
behavior by the regulatory authority can be disciplined.
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courts almost necessarily would engage judges in ranking regulatory choices based
on normative criteria. This contradicts established legal doctrines which direct courts
to focus on agency adherence to procedural mandates, as well as constitutional and
legislative restraints, rather than assess the wisdom of regulatory policy choices.12
4.2 De-biasing
A second way to limit the impact of regulatory biasis to take steps to enable boundedly
rational agents to make decisions as rational agents. De-biasing can include the com-
plete elimination of biases or measures that lead naive regulators (i.e., those who are
unaware of their biases) to account for their biases when making choices. For example,
Jolls (2007) notes that in some experiments, showing jurors pictures of Tiger Woods
before deliberation may act to eliminate unconscious racial bias. Similarly, taking
advantage of the availability heuristic by publicizing the most severe adverse effects
associated with smoking may help counteract over-optimism bias in smoking deci-
sions. Below, we examine two de-biasing strategies in the regulatory context: routine
adversarial review of policies and making regulators more accountable for outcomes.
4.2.1 Adversarial review
As explained above, regulatory institutions are unlikely to feature competition that cor-
rects biases. One way to generate needed feedback is to establish an internal adversarial
process. A serious internal critique of regulatory proposals can help punish irratio-
nal policy choices before they take effect. To some extent, this replicates the negative
feedback the marketplace provides firms that act irrationally. Jolls and Sunstein (2006)
discuss research suggesting that outside directors on corporate boards help to amelio-
rate overly optimistic inside directors. As Jolls (2007) notes, some studies show that
litigants who are forced to consider a case from their adversaries’ perspectives are less
likely to suffer from undue optimism or confirmation bias.
An agency could implement this “B-Team” approach by assigning staff members to
act as defense counsel in a proposed case. This would provide an alternative narrative
to explain documentary and statistical evidence. The adversary team may be biased
as well, but anchoring would be in the opposite direction, forcing the two biases to
compete. As the staff prepares a recommendation to intervene, the B-Team contempo-
raneously could assemble an internal memorandum that musters the best arguments
against the case. The two internal teams also could take part in a mock-trial. A com-
plementary method, used by the FTC, is to have the Bureau of Economics provide
a recommendation separate from the attorney case handlers. The welfare-centered
approach of economics provides a perspective distinct from the orientation of attor-
neys who have investigated a case or researched a proposed rule. Making economists
subordinate to the lawyers in charge of cases or rulemaking mutes the de-biasing effect.
12 See Chevron v. Nat. Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S.
236, 243 (1941); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,
537–538 (1934).
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Ex ante review by external parties also may help to counteract biases in regulatory
decision-making. The Office of Management and Budget must approve proposed rules
and certain research projects (though not cases) before an agency can proceed.13 Ex
ante peer review by a panel of experts, as now used in scientific policymaking, could
also be imported into competition policy-making. Some statutes that require agency
reports compel the agencies to consult with various other regulatory entities that are
likely to have expertise in the subject area.14
In rulemaking, ex post judicial review may force agencies to engage in this type of
de-biasing. Established legal doctrines require agencies to open their decision-making
process to public participation, which acts to solicit multiple opposing viewpoints for
most proposed regulations. Agencies also must show that they considered the record
established during the rulemaking and articulate a plausible nexus between the rule
ultimately adopted and the record evidence.15 As Rachlinski and Farina (2002, pp.
588–589) explain, “Having to assess the force of criticisms coming from a variety of
perspectives, and craft a persuasive response to those criticisms that are (or may be
viewed by a reviewing court as) significant, helps an agency to step outside of the
decision-making process.” This ex post review, however, does not apply to internal
decisions to engage in law enforcement or less formal policy initiatives.
Altering the decision-making structure also may ameliorate biases. Some evidence
involving corporate governance suggests that multimember boards with heterogeneous
priors will act more rationally than a unitary decision maker.16 Public agencies with
bi-partisan boards (e.g., the FTC) may be less susceptible to biases than executive
branch agencies with one decision-maker.
4.2.2 Greater accountability: focus on outcomes rather than outputs
The moral hazard that exists with respect to regulatory decision-making serves to main-
tain biases. Creating an institutional framework that makes regulators more account-
able for the welfare effects of their policies may help provide the feedback needed to
correct or ameliorate biases. As noted earlier, this is easier said than done. Measuring
a policy’s welfare effects can be a daunting task. Nonetheless, if agencies devoted
additional resources to perform ex post evaluations of interventions, with budgets and
other rewards (e.g., fewer hearings, good publicity) tied more closely to these results
rather than outputs, regulators might internalize more of the costs associated with their
biases rather than merely imposing them upon consumers. As a complement to this
policy, longer tenures for regulators would make it more difficult for them to obfuscate
their connection with a failed policy.
13 Rachlinski and Farina (2002, pp. 597–598) criticize OMB review as merely a means to assure conformity
with the President’s political agenda, rather than to satisfy objective welfare criteria.
14 The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, 39 U.S.C. Sec. 101 et seq., required the FTC to consult
with GAO, the USPS, and the Treasury Department for its report.
15 See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. Securities & Exchange Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(internal citations omitted).
16 Of course, any gains from de-biasing must be weighed against the decision-making costs associated
with a multi-member decision-making processes.
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A focus on outcomes also can act as a commitment device to mitigate the effects
of myopia. Consider a regulator who in period 1 faces a choice to announce a case or
initiate a rule making prematurely. The publicity surrounding the announcement and
the impression that “something is being done” garners the regulator immediate polit-
ical benefits of b1. Because action is premature, however, it will provide benefits of
only VL to consumers in period 2. Alternatively, if the regulator waits until period 2 to
decide on the policy—thus allowing more time for research and data collection—the
decision will create benefits VH > VL in period 2.17 Thus, if the regulator chooses to
consume benefits b1 in period 1, she will cause consumers to suffer harm VH − VL in
period 2. We assume that δ is the discount rate and that the regulator places weight θ
on lost welfare VH − VL and φ(1− θ) on b1, because immediate action is more likely
to garner political support.
Following Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004), suppose that the regulator has a
time inconsistent, quasi-hyperbolic discount rate: βδt , where δt is the constant dis-
count rate between adjacent future periods and β < 1 is the hyperbolic component
that increases preferences for current over near-future consumption. Note that as t
increases, the present-bias effect of β diminishes rapidly. Thus, the regulator’s time 0
utility can be written as: U0 −β ∑∞t=1 δtUt . If we assume risk neutrality and substitute
the payoffs the regulator will obtain in periods 1 and 2 for choosing the politically
expedient policy (described above), the present value of the regulator’s utility in period
0 becomes:
U0 + [βδ(1 − θ)φb − βδ2θ(VH − VL)], (7)
which simplifies to:
U0 + [βδ(1 − θ)φb − δθ(VH − VL)], (8)
where U0 is the baseline utility in time 0, and the expression
βδ[(1 − θ)φb − δθ(VH − VL)] is the net present value of choosing to commence
the case prematurely in period 1. To maximize lifetime utility, the regulator in period
0 wants the regulator in period 1 to commence the case in period 1 only if:
(1 − θ)φb1
δθ
> (VH − VL). (9)
At the beginning of period 1, however, U0 = (1 − θ)φb1, and U1 = βδθ(VH − VL).
Thus, the same regulator will now face payoffs from commencing the case of:
(1 − θ)φb1 − βδθ(VH − VL). (10)
Accordingly, the regulator’s period 1 self will commence the action provided that:
(1 − θ)φb1
δθβ
> (VH − VL). (11)
17 This decision may include taking no action.
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Comparing the two decision rules, we see that hyperbolic discounting can lead to
time inconsistent decisions in which the regulator at time zero does not want to see the
case commence in period 1, but changes her mind when period 1 arrives with because
the immediate benefits are now more attractive due to a more heavily discounted





for β < 1, hyperbolic discounting clearly
increases time-inconsistent decisions.
If the regulator had a time-consistent discount rate (i.e., β = 1), the appropriate
rule for commencing action in period 1 would be the same as the rule for the hyper-
bolic-discounting regulator in time 0 (see above): (1−θ)ϕb1
δθ
> (VH −VL). As expected,
with or without hyperbolic discounting, the probability of bringing the case prema-
turely is a positive function of the political benefit from current action and the relative
weight that the regulator places on political rewards versus social welfare. Hyperbolic
discounting, however, implies both a greater propensity for time inconsistency and
well as increased incentives to commence the case prematurely relative to an unbiased
regulator.
A framework that tied rewards to outcomes, rather than outputs, would act to
increase θ because the welfare loss would not only provide internal disutility but
would reduce future rewards. In theory, if the new θ exactly counterbalanced β, the
regulator would act as if she were completely de-biased.A focus on outcomes in period
2 can help make the period 0 regulator credibly commit to bringing a case only when
(1−θ)φb1
δθ
> (VH − VL). Of course, this de-biasing strategy does not lead to optimal
long run policies. As long as the regulator values political rewards, she will always
have some incentives to take premature action. Only strategies that also reduce polit-
ical influence (φ) or increase tastes for long-run welfare (θ) can reduce the public
choice influence on policy making.
5 Conclusion
Much BE research prescribes increased regulatory intervention to constrain consumer
choice in response to consumer biases and to expand use of competition law to correct
consumer harm that arises from biased firm behavior. If regulators, who are human
after all, suffer from the same biases, our analysis suggests a greater skepticism of
these calls for increased intervention. Although regulators are likely to have an edge
over consumers in terms of experience and expertise, it is unclear that they will be
able to intervene in ways that systematically improve welfare. The model we present
shows that political pressure will cause rational regulators to choose policies that are
not optimal from a consumer standpoint, and that in many circumstances regulatory
bias will exacerbate this tendency. We also suggest special caution when trying to
correct firm behavior. Regulatory bias seems likely to endure longer than firm bias
because the market provides a stronger corrective feedback mechanism than exists
in regulatory policy-making. To the extent that we can de-bias regulators—either
through greater use of internal and external adversarial review or by creating a closer
nexus between outcomes and rewards—they will become more effective in devising
welfare-enhancing interventions designed to correct biases of consumers or firms.
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